In the global geopolitical landscape, shaped by the commercial interests of major powers vying for global hegemony and market control, the current debate over port infrastructure in South America is not only strategic in nature but practically a vital or indispensable factor for maintaining a level of competitiveness and presence in the trade of goods, especially for exporting countries.

In this context, Chile finds itself at a key crossroads. The emergence of the Chancay port megaproject in Peru has raised alarm bells in various Chilean economic and political circles, generating a narrative suggesting that the country is falling behind in the race for Pacific port supremacy. However, this partial view overlooks substantive elements regarding the real capacity of the Chilean port system, its institutional framework, and the strategic strengths accumulated over decades.

Chancay: myth and reality

The Chancay port, financed primarily with Chinese capital, is emerging as an emerging competitor with projections of moving between 1 and 1,5 million containers annually in its first phase. This figure, while impressive for a new terminal, pales in comparison to the consolidated operations of Chilean ports such as San Antonio and Valparaíso, which already handle similar or higher figures. Indeed, San Antonio closed 2024 with 1,8 million TEUs transferred, while Valparaíso is approaching one million. Furthermore, the planned San Antonio Outer Port plans to handle up to 6 million TEUs at full capacity, reinforcing Chile's structural advantage.

Comparisons based on absolute capacities, however, are insufficient. What's at stake is not who builds the largest infrastructure, but who has the most solid, resilient, and adaptive port governance to the challenges of the 21st century. In this area, Chile retains significant advantages, although they are under threat if action is not taken promptly.

Institutional framework

Since the enactment of Law 19.542 a decade ago, Chile has adopted a mixed port model, which separates public and private operations. This scheme, by bidding for terminals for 30 non-renewable years and establishing the mandatory return of infrastructure to the State, created a system with scheduled cyclical renewal. This institutional design prevented the system from aging, attracted private investment, and fostered competition, which has resulted in high port productivity.

However, this same design imposes an hourglass, because each expired concession requires a new bidding process. Herein lies one of the major current problems. With the exception of Valparaíso's Terminal 1, no state port has formally initiated the re-concession process. This is serious, since a bidding process takes, on average, seven years from the initial study to the entry into operation of the new concessionaire. Bureaucratic inertia and the upcoming turnover of port company boards could further delay this process, creating an operational vacuum with critical effects on the continuity of service.

Connectivity and public investment

The debate over the San Antonio Outer Port has diverted attention from immediate problems, such as the precarious land and rail connectivity at key terminals, such as San Antonio and San Vicente, in the south of the country. The work on the Barrancas Rail Terminal, in the case of San Antonio, and the improvements to the Biobío network, in the case of San Vicente, are important but insufficient steps. Without a flexible logistics network, any expansion of port capacity will be limited by upstream bottlenecks. The paradox is that a large part of these investments falls on the state, since concessionaires cannot finance improvements to assets they do not manage, and with contracts about to expire, they are also unwilling to invest in assets that will soon pass into the hands of third parties.

Furthermore, the correct valuation of contingent liabilities—a topic almost invisible in public debate—represents a silent but powerful barrier. International accounting standards (IFRS, IAS 37) require the balance sheet to reflect the value of the works that will be returned to the treasury. A lack of consensus between transferors and concessionaires on these values ​​can lead to legal disputes or paralyze entire bidding processes.

Comprehensive agenda

Faced with this situation, Chile's strategy should not be a spasmodic or alarmist reaction to the "Chancay effect," but rather a comprehensive agenda with short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, which should include an immediate call for new tenders and accelerated investment in logistics connectivity. Without addressing port access, any capacity gains will be offset by structural inefficiencies.

Clarity and transparency in accounting liabilities is another factor this agenda must consider, because anticipating audits and establishing unified criteria for depreciation is key to avoiding legal conflicts.

Finally, there must be effective institutional coordination. Transport, Public Works, Finance, the Environment, and port companies must act in a coordinated and strategic manner. Fragmentation is the most dangerous enemy of the port calendar.

Second technological leap

Far from stagnating, the Chilean port system shows signs of vitality. San Antonio's TEU transfers grew by 11% in the first two months of 2025. The TPS in Valparaíso maintains demanding operating standards and is carrying out significant expansions. These achievements confirm that Chile doesn't need to copy foreign models, but rather perfect its own. The key isn't more concrete, but better public management.

In conclusion, Chile has a legal and operational structure that has proven successful. The real challenge is to honor that model, avoid complacency, and maintain the continuity of visionary policies. Regional port competition will not be won with isolated megaprojects, but with integrated, reliable, and efficient systems. If Chile decides to move decisively, as it did in the 90s, it will be in a position not only to confront Chancay, but to transform it into a strategic partner in the Pacific, with a strengthened port network.

This topic will be analyzed in detail from different perspectives in the next edition of Blue Magazine, which is distributed free of charge in the International Seminars de Blueberries Consulting and at other meetings of the international agro-fruit industry.

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